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Abstract
We develop and extend a line of recent works on the design of mechanisms for heterogeneous
tasks assignment problem in ’crowdsourcing’. The budgeted market we consider consists of
multiple task requesters and multiple IoT devices as task executers; where each task requester
is endowed with a single distinct task along with the publicly known budget. Also, each IoT
device has valuations as the cost for executing the tasks and quality, which are private. Given
such scenario, the objective is to select a subset of IoT devices for each task, such that the total
payment made is within the allotted quota of the budget while attaining a threshold quality. For
the purpose of determining the unknown quality of the IoT devices we have utilized the concept
of peer grading. In this paper, we have carefully crafted a truthful budget feasible mechanism;
namely TUBE-TAP for the problem under investigation that also allows us to have the true
information about the quality of the IoT devices. The simulations are performed in order to
measure the efficacy of our proposed mechanism.
1 Introduction
Over the past decades, most of the works in crowdsourcing 1[11][23] mainly circumvent around
tackling one of the major challenges of how to motivate the crowd workers to participate in the
system? One solution that is appreciated a lot in this direction is, to incentivize the task executers.
This gave rise to several other open questions: 1) Which task executers to be hired? 2) How the
task requester(s) can be aware about the quality of the task executers (or crowd workers)? 3) What
amount is to be paid to the task executers for their services, so that they are not dishearten and
are motivated to participate in future, in similar type of systems? Answering to the above raised
questions, substantial amount of works have been done in these directions [3][9][10][13][12][16][4].
Unlike the works in [24][15], in this paper, we have investigated the set-up somehow close to the
set-up discussed in [10][2] but with additional constraints: 1) the task executers are the IoT devices
instead of human agents, and 2) in order to be aware about the quality of IoT devices, we have
utilized the technique of peer grading, that is different from the general practice for identifying the
quality of the human agents [13][3]. It is to be noted that, till date, in the crowdsourcing literature
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this tedious work of determining the quality of the crowd workers is mostly done by the platform
or in some cases by the task requesters. This leads to an extra burden on the platform or the task
requesters. Also, this scenario makes the process of quality determination centralized. In our peer
grading approach, we use to distribute the task executed by the subset of IoT devices to their peers
(other IoT devices) for grading purpose. Based on the peers report, the quality IoT devices are
selected.
The detailing of our proposed model is depicted in Figure 1. In our model, we have multiple
task requesters and multiple IoT devices (as task executers); where each task requester is endowed
with a single task and the maximum amount he/she (henceforth he) can pay is termed as budget
(or capital). Each IoT device has independent private cost(s) for each task that they will charge for
executing. It is to be noted that, the participating IoT devices are intelligent and rational. Due to
their rational behaviour they will try to strategize the system. By strategizing we mean that these
devices can manipulate their private information in order to gain. Given this set-up, our goal is to
select the subset of IoT devices for each task such that the total payment made to the IoT devices
are within the allotted quota of budget for the task while attaining a threshold quality.
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Figure 1: A Pictorial representation of proposed model
Following the general work flow of the crowdsourcing, firstly, each task requester submits the
endowed task and the publicly known budget to the platform. On receiving the tasks and the
endowed capital for the respective task from the task requesters, the platform publishes the tasks
to the outside world for the execution purpose. Now, each IoT device present on the other side of
the market opts for the subset of tasks of their interest for execution and report to the platform
along with the amount they will charge for executing each task. Based on their reported interests,
the platform assigns the tasks to the IoT devices. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that
each IoT device will execute all of its tasks for which it has shown interest and each IoT device
executes single task at a time. Now, the immediate question is: How to preserve the assumptions
made for the problem under investigation? One solution that can be thought of is to place each of
the task of an IoT device on which it has shown interest into different time slots (here, time slots
could be thought of as morning, afternoon, and evening for a day) that will help in keeping our
assumptions alive.
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Say, for example an IoT device has shown his interest over 3 tasks. In such case, one task will
be scheduled in the morning, another task in the afternoon, and the third task could be scheduled in
the evening.
After the distribution of tasks into different time slots, the IoT devices executes the assigned
task(s) and submit to the platform as depicted in Figure 1. Now, the next challenge that comes
into the pocket of the platform is to determine the quality of the IoT devices. For this purpose, the
idea of peer grading [1][20] is utilized in our set-up. It is to be noted that, in each time slot and
for each task, the process of peer grading is carried out iteratively. The process iterates until each
IoT device is not graded by the peers. At the end of each iteration of the peer grading phase, the
IoT device top rated (or graded) by most of the peers, is selected. Finally, the peer grading process
returns a set of quality IoT devices for each task. Now, given the set of quality IoT devices for
each task, we have to select a subset of IoT devices such that the total payment made are within
the allotted quota of budget. As the IoT devices are strategic in our setting, so for this reason we
have modelled the above discussed set-up using mechanism design.
In this paper, we have carefully crafted a truthful budget feasible mechanism for the task
allocation problem (TUBE-TAP) motivated by [21][22], that also allow us to have the true infor-
mation about the quality of the IoT devices2.
1.1 Summary of Key Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are:
- We have investigated the heterogeneous task assignment problem in IoT based crowdsourcing
through the lens of mechanism design.
- We have developed a truthful budget feasible mechanism; namely TUBE-TAP motivated by
[21][22] for the problem under investigation.
- We prove that TUBE-TAP satisfies several economic properties such as truthfulness, and
budget feasibility.
- The simulations are done for comparing the TUBE-TAP with a carefully crafted benchmark
mechanism.
1.2 Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the prior works explored in the
direction of crowdsourcing is discussed. In Section 3, we describe our proposed system model in
detailed manner. We then present our proposed mechanism namely TUBE-TAP for the problem
discussed in section 4. Further analysis of TUBE-TAP is carried out in section 5. In section 6
the experimental results are presented and discussed. In section 7 the paper is concluded and the
future directions are coined.
2It is to be noted, our proposed system is applicable equally to the system where there are human agents instead
of IoT devices in the role of task executers.
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2 Related Works
This section contains a short description of the previous works and developments in this area. The
discussion will mainly circumvent around the works regarding incentive policies utilized in the past
for dragging large number of participants, and quality of the executed works supplied by the task
executers, in crowdsourcing. In order to get the detailed overview of the field and the current
research trends we recommend readers to go through [11][25][23][17].
In past there have been an extensive body of works discussing about the major challenges in
crowdsourcing [23] and in some cases providing the solution approach [3][12][16]. The two major
challenges in crowdsourcing that have dragged the interest of large community are: 1) How to
motivate large group of common people to participate in this system as they are rational. 2) How
to verify that the executed tasks supplied by the agents are upto the mark. Answering to the issue
raised in point 1 several schemes are proposed that incentivizes the participating agents in some
sense [16][10][3][6]. In [19] the fixed price scheme is proposed in which the platform or in some
applications task requesters provide some fixed amount to the crowd workers. The drawback to
such approach is that the agents are paid less than the effort supplied. This pricing structure has
resolved the issue raised in point 1 to some extent but not completely.
In [15] reverse auction based incentive scheme called ’RADP’ is proposed for the setting with
single task requester having single task that is to be given to the multiple crowd workers on the
other side of the market. In this, some pre-defined number of task executers with lowest bid
values are selected and paid their revealed bid price. One issue with this solution approach is that
the participants those who are giving much high effort may bid high and may not be reaching
in the selection zone. In some sense, this pricing model may demotivate the quality agents. To
overcome the issue raised in [15], in [14] a reverse auction based incentive scheme with virtual
participant credit (RADP-VPC) is proposed. Here, the idea is, the participant who lost in the
current iteration is provided a specific reward for the participation and if the loser participate
further then this virtual credit will be subtracted from his original bid value that may lead to the
consideration of participants in further auction rounds. One drawback with this strategy is that
the participant can set the high bid value as his/her payment. Following works in [19][14], a better
auction models were proposed [26][8][7].
In [10], an effort has been made to design a truthful budget feasible mechanism for crowdsourcing
in an online environment for the set-up consisting of single task requester endowed with multiple
tasks and there are multiple task executers on the other side of the market. The task executers
along with the private cost have different skills based on which they show their interest to perform
certain subset of tasks. The goal is to select subset of task executers so that the total payment
made to the task executers are within budget. In the similar line, the work by [24] is carried out
where, the set-up consists of multiple tasks with deadlines that are to be executed by the pool of
workers that arrive online. Each of the worker has the known set of tasks that he/she can perform
and based on that the task is assigned to the workers before its deadline. The goal is to design an
online-assignment policy such that the total expected profit is maximized subject to budget and
deadline constraint.
However, one of the major set back of the literature covered till now is that the quality of the
data supplied or more formally, the quality of the crowd workers are not taken into picture. Some
quality adaptive schemes are discussed in [13][9]. In this paper, an effort has been made to design
a quality adaptive truthful budget feasible mechanism for one of the scenarios of ’crowdsourcing’.
We have utilized the concept of ’peer grading ’ for determining the quality of the IoT devices.
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3 System Model and Problem Formulation
In this section, we present the formal statement of our problem. We consider n task requesters
R = {R1,R2, . . . ,Rn} each carrying a single distinct task. The set of tasks is represented as
T = {T1,T2, . . . ,Tn}; where Ti is the ith task held by Ri task requester. The set-up, where each
task requester carrying multiple tasks is reserved for our future work. Also, along with a task,
each task requester Ri ∈ R has an upper bound on the amount he/she (henceforth he) can pay
for getting his task executed, known as budget represented as Bi. The budget vector for all the
task requesters is given as B = {B1,B2, . . . ,Bn}. Each of the task requester submits the endowed
task along with their publicly known budget to the platform. The platform projects these tasks
to the IoT devices present on the other side of the market. In our set-up, we have m IoT devices
represented by the set E = {E1,E2, . . . ,Em}. It is considered that m  n. Afterwards, each IoT
device shows its interest over the set of tasks for execution purpose to the platform along with
the maximum value it can charge for executing each task. Utilizing the submitted information
by the IoT devices, we can have the set of IoT devices that are interested to execute the task Tj
and is given as Ij = {E1,E2, . . . ,Ekj}; where kj is the number of IoT devices associated with task
Tj . The set I = {I1, I2, . . . , In} represents the associated set of IoT devices for all the n tasks.
The maximum value an IoT device Ei will charge for executing a task Tj is given as vji called the
valuation. The valuations of the IoT devices are private in nature. It is to be noted that the IoT
devices are strategic in nature. By strategic we mean that the IoT devices can misreport their
private valuation in order to gain. So, it is better to represent the bid value of each IoT device
Ei for executing the task Tj as bji . b
j
i = v
j
i represents the fact that the IoT device Ei report its
private valuation bji for the task Tj in a truthful manner. The bid vector for each task Tj is given
as bj = {bj1, bj2, . . . , bjkj}. The set b = {b1, b2, . . . , bn} represents the set of bid vectors of the IoT
devices for all the tasks. Based on the set I, a non-conflict graph G(V, E) is constructed; where V
is the set of vertices representing the tasks. An edge (i, j) ∈ E between the tasks i and j represents
the fact that the pair (i, j) have at least one IoT device that is associated to both the tasks. Once
the graph is constructed, next target is to place the tasks along with their respective IoT devices
to different time slots so as to preserve the assumptions made. The set of time slots to which all
the tasks are placed in, is given as τ = {1, 2, . . . , κ}; where κ is the number of time slots available.
Afterwards, in peer grading phase, each IoT device Ei provides a ranked list over the subset of IoT
devices associated with task Tj denoted by ji , where E` ji Ek means that the IoT device Ei ranks
E` above Ek. For each task Tj , this peer grading process will result in the quality IoT devices. Now,
the next target is to select the subset of IoT devices from the quality IoT devices for each task
and decide their payment. The allocation vector for all the tasks is given as A = {A1,A2, . . . ,An};
where Ai contains the IoT devices selected for task Ti. Similarly, the payment vector of all the
IoT devices for n tasks is given as P = {P 1,P 2, . . . ,P n}. Here, P j is the payment vector of IoT
devices associated with task Tj and is given as P j = {P j1, . . . ,P jkj}; where P
j
i is the payment
received by IoT device Ei for executing task Tj . The utility achieved by any ith IoT device for each
task Tj could be defined as the payment it received for executing task Tj minus the valuation of an
IoT device for task Tj , if it is considered for task Tj ; otherwise 0. This can be represented formally
as:
uji =
{
P ji − vji , if Ei is considered for task Tj
0, Otherwise
(1)
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Definition 1 (Incentive Compatible (IC) [18]). A mechanism is said to be truthful or IC if reporting
true valuation by any agent i will maximize its utility irrespective of the valuations of other agents.
Formally in our case, for any arbitrary IoT device Ei for task Tj the utility relation is uji = P
j
i−vji ≥
P ji − bji = uˆji ; where uji is the utility when Ei reports true value and uˆji is the utility when reporting
the bid other than the true value bji 6= vji .
Definition 2 (Individual Rationality (IR) [18]). A mechanism is said to be individually rational if
every agent i results in a non-negative utility. More formally in our case, uji ≥ 0 when participating
in the system
Definition 3 (Budget Feasibility (BF) [21]). A mechanism is said to be budget feasible if the total
payment made to the agents are within total budget. More formally in our case, fix a task Tj we
have,
kj∑
i=1
P ji ≤ Bj.
4 Proposed Mechanism: TUBE-TAP
In this section, we have proposed a truthful mechanism namely TUBE-TAP for the problem under
investigation. The main components of the TUBE-TAP are: Time slot allocation heuristic, Quality
determination rule, and Allocation and payment rule.
4.1 Time slot allocation heuristic
The underlying idea behind proposing Time Slot Allocation Heuristic motivated by3 is to distribute
the tasks into different time slots, so that: (a) the IoT devices gets the privilege to execute all the
tasks for which they have shown their interest; (b) each IoT device executes a single task at a time.
4.1.1 Outline of Time slot allocation heuristic
Time slot allocation heuristic
First Phase:
1. Pick a task Ti which has less than κ adjacent tasks in a graph G.
2. Put Ti on the stack and remove it along with the incident edges from the graph G.
3. Repeat step 1 and 2, until the graph G is non-empty.
Second Phase: In each iteration:
1. Pop the task present at the top of the stack.
2. Assign it the lowest numbered time slot that is not assigned to any of its neighbouring
tasks.
3https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJfQQNY7NdU
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4.1.2 Detailed Time slot allocation heuristic
This section explains the detailing of the Time Slot Allocation Heuristic presented in the Algorithm
1. As in the outline of the Time Slot Allocation Heuristic in subsection 4.1.1, it is discussed
that it is a two phase mechanism. The first phase of the mechanism is depicted in line 2 − 9 of
Algorithm 1. In each iteration of while loop in line 2 − 9, a task with neighbours less than the κ
(κ time slots are available) is picked-up and is pushed into the stack S. Next, the recently pushed
task is removed from the graph G along with its incident edges. In the second phase, shown in
line 10 − 14 of Algorithm 1, the actual process of time slots allocation is carried out. For each
iteration of while loop in line 10-14, the currently present top element is popped out of the stack
S and held in k data structure. The element held in k data structure is added back to graph G.
ALGORITHM 1: Time slot allocation heuristic (G, κ)
1 G′ ← G, S ← φ
2 while G 6= φ do
3 foreach Tj ∈ V do
4 if |adj(Tj)| < κ then
5 Push(S, Tj) // Task Tj is pushed into the stack S
6 G← G \ {Tj} // Task Tj is removed from G
7 end
8 end
9 end
10 while S 6= φ do
11 k ← Pop(S) // k holds an element popped-up from stack S
12 G← G ∪ {k} // Construct graph G by utilizing the neighbours information from G′
13 Assign k the lowest numbered time slot that is not assigned to any of its neighbours.
14 end
15 return G
Each time a task is added in a graph G the information about neighbouring tasks is fetched
from G′ graph. Now, the task added in current iteration is assigned a lowest numbered time slot
that is not assigned to its neighbours using line 13. The while loop terminates once the stack is
empty, or in other words each task is assigned a time slot. Finally, in line 15 a graph G containing
the information about the assigned time slot to each of the task is returned.
Example 1. For the understanding purpose, we have considered 5 tasks and 20 IoT devices.
Tasks IoT Devices
T2
T1 E1, E3, E4, E6, E9, E10, E13, E15, E17
E2, E3, E5, E6, E10, E12, E16, E18
E12, E16, E19T3
T4 E1, E3, E4, E6, E7, E9, E10, E19
T5 E6, E7, E9,E10, E11, E14, E15, E19, E20
(a) IoT devices showing interests over tasks
T1 T2
T4T3
T5
(b) Non-conflict graph
T1 T2
T4T3
T5
(c) Time slot allocation to tasks
Figure 2: Detailed illustration of Algorithm 1
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Let the budget associated with the 5 tasks are: B1 = 50$, B2 = 25$, B3 = 30$, B4 = 60$, and
B5 = 15$. For each task, the interested set of IoT devices is depicted in Figure 2a. Figure 2a will
be read as, say for example consider task T3. The IoT devices that are interested to execute task
T3 are E12, E16, and E19. Based on the configuration shown in Figure 2a, a graph G is formed as
shown in Figure 2b. Note that the tasks T1 and T3 do not share any common IoT devices, so they
do not have an edge between them. The result of which they can be placed in the same time slot. In
our case the tasks T1 and T3 belong to the same time slot, say time slot 1. Tasks T2, T4, and T5
share a common IoT devices so they have an edge between them and will be placed in three different
time slots. Also, these tasks have an edge with T1 and T3 so they can not be placed in time slot 1.
Let the task T2, T4, and T5 are placed in time slot 2, time slot 3, and time slot 4 respectively.
4.2 Quality Determination Mechanism
As the quality of the IoT devices are unknown, in this section a mechanism is proposed for deter-
mining the quality of the IoT devices. First, the outline of the Quality Determination Mechanism
is presented in sub section 4.2.1 and in sub section 4.2.2 the detailed version of the mechanism is
discussed.
4.2.1 Outline of The Quality Determination Mechanism
Quality Determination Mechanism
Repeat:
1. For each task Ti, assign r IoT devices to r
′ other IoT devices for the ranking purpose;
here r′  r.
2. Select an IoT device that appears at first place in most of the rankings.
Until: Each IoT device is considered for the ranking.
4.2.2 Detailed Quality Determination Mechanism
This section presents the detailing of the Quality Determination Mechanism. Prior to this mecha-
nism, the Main Routine is presented in Algorithm 2. The idea behind providing the Main Routine
is to capture each task of the system present in different time slots.
ALGORITHM 2: Main Routine (G, B, I, τ , T, b)
Output: A, P
1 foreach i ∈ τ do
2 foreach Tj ∈ i do
3 (pij , b˜j) ← Quality Determination Mechanism (Tj , Ij)
4 (A′j ,P
′
j) ← Allocation and Payment Rule (pij , b˜j , Bj)
5 A← A ∪ A′j
6 P ← P ∪ P ′j
7 end
8 end
9 return A, P
8
In main routine, line 1 − 8 keeps track of each time slot and in each time slot each task is
taken care by line 2 − 7. Line 9 returns the allocation and payment vectors for all the tasks in
the system. In Algorithm 3, initialization of data structures are done in line 1. In line 2, Ψ′j and
Ψj data structures keeps the copy of the IoT devices that execute the task Tj . The do while loop
in line 3-14 iterates until all the IoT devices got ranked. Using line 4, r random IoT devices are
picked up that are to be ranked and stored in the data structure Ψ. Similarly, in line 5, the r′ IoT
devices other than that are selected by line 4 of Algorithm 3 are considered for the ranking process
and stored in data structure ϕ. Here, r′  r. Line 6 assigns the completed task of each IoT device
in set Ψ to each of the IoT device Ei in ϕ for ranking purpose.
ALGORITHM 3: Quality Determination Mechanism (Tj , Ij)
Output: Φj ← φ
1 Ψ← φ, ϕ← φ, N ′ ← φ, β ← φ
2 Ψ′j = Ψj = I
j
// Ψ′j and Ψj keeps the copy of IoT devices that executes Tj.
3 do
4 Ψ ← Pick random (Ψj , r) // Pick r IoT devices from Ψj.
5 ϕ ← Pick random (Ψ′j \Ψ, r′) // Pick r′ IoT devices from Ψ′j \Ψ.
6 Assign the completed task Tj of each IoT devices in Ψ to the IoT devices in ϕ.
7 forall Ei ∈ ϕ do
8 β ← Select best(ji ) // Select top ranked IoT device from Ei′s ranked list for task
Tj given as ji.
9 N ′ ← N ′ ∪ {β} // N ′ data structure allows the duplication of elements.
10 end
11 Φj ← Φj ∪ { max
Ek∈N ′
{|Sk|}} // Sk is the set of Ek′s in N ′.
12 b˜j ← b˜j ∪ {bjk} // b˜j maintains the bid values of the quality IoT devices.
13 Ψj ← Ψj \Ψ
14 while Ψj 6= φ
15 return Φj , b˜j
Using line 7-10 for each iteration of for loop record about the top ranked IoT device by each
Ei ∈ ϕ is kept in the N ′ data structure. In line 11, Φj data structure captures the IoT device that
was ranked top by most of the IoT devices for task Tj . Line 13 removes the IoT devices that are
ranked in the current iteration from Ψj . Finally, line 14 returns Φj that contains the quality IoT
devices for task Tj .
Example 2. For the detailed illustration of Algorithm 3 we have considered the set-up discussed
E1: ≻11E3 E9 E15≻11
E4: ≻14E3 E15 E9≻14
E6: ≻16E15 E3 E9≻16
E10: ≻110E9 E15 E3≻110
E13: ≻113E15 E3 E9≻113
E17: ≻117E3 E15 E9≻117
E3
(a) Peer grading (1st iteration)
E3: ≻13E4 E10 E1≻13
E6: ≻16E4 E1 E10≻16
E9: ≻19E1 E4 E10≻19
E13: ≻113E10 E1 E4≻113
E15: ≻115E1 E4 E10≻115
E17: ≻117E4 E1 E10≻117
E4
(b) Peer grading (2nd iteration)
E1: ≻11E6 E13 E17≻11
E3: ≻13E6 E17 E13≻13
E4: ≻14E17 E6 E13≻14
E9: ≻19E13 E17 E6≻19
E10: ≻110E17 E6 E13≻110
E15: ≻115E6 E17 E13≻115
E6
(c) Peer grading (3rd iteration)
Figure 3: Detailed illustration of Algorithm 3
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in Example 1. In this example, we have illustrated Algorithm 3 for one task, say task T1.
However, one can follow the similar procedure for the remaining tasks. For the 1st iteration of the
peer grading process, we have randomly selected 3 IoT devices (r = 3) say E3, E9, and E15 and
assigned to the remaining IoT devices for the grading purposes. Next, following the Algorithm 3,
we have to check which IoT device among E3, E9, and E15 has been top ranked by the majority
of the peers. From Figure 3a one can see that E3 has been top ranked by the majority of the
peers. So, for the time being Φ1 = {E3}. In the similar fashion, we can follow the other iterations
of the peer grading process as shown in Figure 3b and Figure 3c and determine the quality IoT
devices. At the end of the peer grading process, the set of quality IoT devices for task T1 is given
as Φ1 = {E3,E4,E6}.
4.3 Allocation and Payment Rule
ALGORITHM 4: Allocation and Payment Rule (pij , b˜j , Bj)
Output: Aj , P j
/* Allocation Rule */
1 Sort(pij , b˜j) // Sort pij based on b˜j as b
j
1 ≤ bj2 ≤ . . . ≤ bjk˜j; such that k˜j < kj
2 k ← 1
3 while bji ≤ Bjk do
4 Aj ← Aj ∪ {Ei}
5 k ← k + 1
6 end
/* Payment Rule */
7 foreach Ei ∈ Aj do
8 P ji ← {min{Bjk , bjk+1}}
9 P j ← P j ∪ {P ji}
10 end
11 return Aj , P j
This section explains the Allocation and Payment Rule presented in the Algorithm 4. Consid-
ering the allocation rule, in line 1 first the quality IoT devices in pij is sorted in increasing order
based on the bid vector b˜j . The variable k is initialized to 1. The while loop in line 3−6 determines
the largest index k that satisfies the stopping condition of the while loop. The Aj data structure
in line 4 keeps track of winning IoT devices. Talking about the payment rule, for each Ei in Aj the
minimum among
Bj
k and b
j
k+1 is taken as the payment. Finally, line 11 returns the allocation and
payment for the task Tj .
Example 3. For understanding the allocation and payment rule, let us continue with the quality
IoT devices resulted from Example 2. The budget given for task T1 is 50 $. The quality IoT devices
along with their bid values is depicted in Figure 4a. Utilizing Algorithm 4 in the set-up shown in
Figure ??, first the IoT devices are sorted in decreasing order of their bid value as shown in Figure
4b. In our case, from the ordering, first E4 is picked up and considered as the check 10 ≤ 501 is
satisfied for E4. Next, E3 is picked up from the ordering and is also considered because of the similar
reason. Next, E6 is picked up from the ordering and will be not be considered as the check 30 ≤ 503
is not satisfied.
10
IoT
Devices
Bid values
E3 E4 E6
20 10 30
(a) Bid value configuration
E4
10 ≤ 501
X
E3
20 ≤ 502
X
E6
30 ≤ 503
✗
(b) Allocation resulted
P 44 = min{502 , 30} = 25
P 43 = min{502 , 30} = 25
E4
E3
(c) Payment determination
Figure 4: Detailed illustration of Algorithm 4 (case with
Bj
k as payment)
So, we have A1 = {E4,E3} as the winning set. So, we get the k value as 2 for our example.
Next, the payment calculation of the E4 and E3 is presented in Figure 4c. For E4 we have P 14 =
min{502 , 30} = 25, and for E3 we have P 13 = min{502 , 30} = 25.
Example 4. As in the above example, it can be seen that the payment for both the IoT devices is
the left term of the payment rule, so the remaining budget is zero. In order to see when the right
term of the payment rule will be coming into picture the example in Figure 4 is repeated for different
bid configuration in Figure 5.
IoT
Devices
Bid values
E3 E4 E6
20 10 21
(a) Bid value configuration
E4
10 ≤ 501
X
E3
20 ≤ 502
X
E6
21 ≤ 503
✗
(b) Allocation resulted
P 44 = min{502 , 21} = 21
P 43 = min{502 , 21} = 21
E4
E3
(c) Payment determination
Figure 5: Detailed illustration of Algorithm 4 (case with bjk+1 as payment)
In this example, the allocation set will be similar to what we obtained for Example 3 as shown
in Figure 5b. The payment calculation of the IoT devices E4 and E3 is presented in Figure 5c. For
E4 we have P 14 = min{502 , 21} = 21, and for E3 we have P 13 = min{502 , 21} = 21.
5 Analysis of TUBE-TAP
This section presents the analysis of TUBE-TAP.
Proposition 5.1. The proposed mechanism in [21] has an approximation ratio of 2.
Lemma 5.2. TUBE-TAP is truthful.
Proof. The proof is divided into two cases. In the first case, we have taken an arbitrary winning
IoT device into consideration and discuss the impact on its gain (or utility), when it deviates from
its true valuation. In second case, we have considered any arbitrary losing IoT device and analysis
similar to Case 1 is done. Fix a task Tj .
Case 1: Let us suppose that ith winning IoT device deviates from its true value and reports a
bid value bji < v
j
i . As the IoT device Ei was winning with v
j
i it will continue to win with b
j
i because
by reporting value lesser than the true value, it will be appearing early in the ordering. So, its
utility will be uˆji = P
j
i − vji which is same as uji . But, if it reports bji > vji , this gives rise to two
possibilities. One possibility could be, it would continue to win by appearing later in the ordering
and in that case his utility will be uˆji = P
j
i − vji = uji . Another possibility could be, it may lose by
appearing later in the ordering in that case its utility will be uˆji = 0.
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Case 2: Let us suppose that ith losing IoT device deviates from its true value and reports a bid
value bji > v
j
i . As the IoT device Ei was losing with v
j
i it will continue to lose by b
j
i because by
deviating this way it will be appearing later in the ordering. So, its gain will be uˆji = 0 which is
same as uji . But, if it reports b
j
i < v
j
i , then the two possibilities arises. One possibility could be,
by deviating this way it could appear early in the ordering but still continue to lose and in that
case uˆji = 0 which is same as u
j
i . Another possibility could be, it could win, in that case it had
defeated the IoT device Ek with valuation vjk < v
j
i and hence b
j
i < v
j
k. In this case, its payment will
be less as compared to its true valuation. So, its utility uˆji = P
j
i−vji < 0. Hence, no gain is achieved.
Considering Case 1 and Case 2, it can be concluded that the IoT devices cannot gain by
misreporting their true value. So, TUBE-TAP is truthful.
Lemma 5.3. In TUBE-TAP, for each task requester Rj the total payment P j made to the IoT
devices are within available budget Bj. More formally, P j =
∑
Ei∈Aj
P ji ≤ Bj. Also,
∑
Aj∈A
∑
Ei∈Aj
P ji ≤∑
Tj∈T
Bj.
Proof. Fix a task requester Rj and a task Tj . From the construction of TUBE-TAP, it is clear
that, the maximum payment that any winning IoT device will be paid is
Bj
k ; where k is the largest
index obtained in the ordering of IoT devices that satisfies bjk ≤ Bjk . Now, the total payment P j is
given as:
P j =
∑
Ei∈Aj
P ji ≤
∑
Ei∈Aj
Bj
k
=
Bj
k
× k = Bj
From here we can say that, P j ≤ Bj . As this is true for any task Tj , so the budget feasibility will
hold for all the available tasks i.e.
∑
Aj∈A
∑
Ei∈Aj
P ji ≤
∑
Tj∈T
Bj . This completes the proof.
Lemma 5.4. The allocation resulted by TUBE-TAP is at most 2 allocation away from the optimal
one i.e. OPT ≤ 2 × OM ; where OPT is the optimal allocation and OM is the allocation resulted
by TUBE-TAP.
Proof. Fix a task requester Ri and task Ti. Let us suppose for the sake of contradiction that the
OPT consists of k IoT devices i.e. |OPT | = k and OM consists of less than k2 IoT devices i.e.
|OM | < k2 . It implies that, bik
2
> Bik/2 . Note however, that this is impossible since we assume that
bik
2
≤ . . . ≤ bik, and
∑k
j= k
2
bij ≤ Bi which implies that bik
2
≤ Bik/2 . Hence a contradiction.
Lemma 5.5. Let U be the event given as U = {Ei is considered for task Tj} and Xij is an indi-
cator random variable defined as Xij = I{U}. Then, the expectation is just the probability of the
corresponding event i.e. E[Xij ] = Pr{U} [5].
Proof. By the definition of indicator random variable, we can write Xij is 1 when U occurs and 0
when U does not occurs. So, as Xij = I{U}. Taking expectation both side, we get
E[Xij ] = E[I{U}]
= 1 · Pr{U}+ 0 · Pr{U¯}
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E[Xij ] = Pr{U}
where, U¯ denotes S − U such that S is the sample space.
Lemma 5.6. The expected number of times any arbitrary Ei is considered (or winning) is given
as p · ki; where ki is the number of tasks for which the ith IoT device has shown interest and p is
the probability with which Ei is considered for a task. In other words, E[Xi] = p · ki; where Xi is
the random variable measuring the number of times Ei is considered out of ki.
Proof. Fix an IoT device Ei, we now wish to compute the expected number of times the Ei is
considered. We capture the total number of times Ei is considered out of ki by Xi random variable.
So, the expected number of times Ei is considered is given as E[Xi]. Our sample space for Ei IoT
device for any task Tj is S= {Ei is considered for task Tj , Ei not considered for task Tj}. So, we
have Pr{Ei is considered for task Tj}= p and Pr{Ei is not considered for task Tj} = 1− p.
We define the indicator random variable Xij as X
i
j = I{Ei is considered for task Tj}; where
Xij =
{
1, if Ei is considered for task Tj
0, Otherwise
(2)
The expected number of times Ei is considered for task Tj is simply the expected value of our
indicator random variable Xij :
E[Xij ] = E[I{Ei is considered for task Tj}]
As always with the indicator random variable, the expectation is just the probability of the corre-
sponding event (using lemma 5.5):
E[Xij ] = 1 · Pr{Xij = 1}+ 0 · Pr{Xij = 0}
= 1 · p+ 0 · (1− p)
= 1 · p
E[Xij ] = p
Now, let us consider the random variable that we are interested in and is given by Xi =
ki∑
j=1
Xij .
We can compute E[Xi] by taking expectation both side, we get:
E[Xi] = E
[ ki∑
j=1
Xij
]
By linearity of expectation, we get
E[Xi] =
ki∑
j=1
E[Xij ]
From lemma 5.5 it can be seen that, the expected value of any random variable is equal to the
probability of the corresponding event. So,
E[Xi] =
ki∑
j=1
Pr{Ei is considered for task Tj}
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=ki∑
j=1
p
= p · ki.
Hence, the claim survived. It is to be noted that if p = 12 , then the value of E[X
i] boils down to
ki
2 . It means that, any arbitrary Ei in expectation will be considered for half of number of tasks on
which it has shown interest.
Lemma 5.7. For any arbitrary IoT device Ei the expected number of longest contiguous rejection
out of ki tasks after which the IoT device is considered is given as Θ(logp ki). More formally, we can
say E[Y ] = Θ(logp ki); where Y is a random variable that captures the longest continuous rejection
of any IoT device.
Proof. Fix an IoT device Ei. In similar line the proof is illustrated in [5]. Our proof is divided into
two cases. From Lemma 5.6 it can be seen that the probability that Ei will be considered for any
task Tj is p. Let Xikl = I{Aikl} be the indicator random variable associated with an event that
the IoT device Ei is rejected for at least l tasks starting form kth task. It is to be noted that, the
participation in one time slot by the IoT device is independent of the participation in other time
slots. So, for any given event Xikl, the probability that for all l tasks the IoT device is rejected is
given as
Pr{Aikl} = p · p · · · l times = pl (3)
As in our case, k varies from 1 to ki − l + 1 (i.e. 1 ≤ k ≤ ki − l + 1), so the total number of such
rejections could be formulated as:
Y =
ki−l+1∑
k=1
Xikl
Taking expectation both side, we get
E[Y ] = E
[ ki−l+1∑
k=1
Xikl
]
By linearity of expectation, we get
=
ki−l+1∑
k=1
E[Xikl]
From the definition of expectation in Lemma 5.5, we have
E[Y ] =
ki−l+1∑
k=1
Pr{Aikl}
Using equation 3, we get
=
ki−l+1∑
k=1
pl
E[Y ] = (ki − l + 1) · pl
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Now, for l = c logp ki and for some positive constant c, we obtain
E[Y ] = (ki − c logp ki + 1) · pc logp ki
= (ki − c logp ki + 1) · kci
= kc+1i − ckci logp ki + kci
= Θ(kci )
From here we can conclude that, for some constant c ≥ 1 the longest continuous rejection boils
down to Θ(logp ki). Hence, the claim survived.
Lemma 5.8. In our system, the probability that any arbitrary IoT device Ei is considered (or wins)
for at least one time out of ki is greater than or equal to 1− 1ep·ki ; where ki is the number of tasks
for which the ith IoT device has shown interest. In other words, Pr[Xi ≥ 1] ≥
(
1− 1
ep·ki
)
; where
Xi is the random variable measuring the number of times Ei IoT device is considered out of ki.
Proof. Fix an IoT device Ei. As Ei has shown interest on ki tasks that are present in different time
slots. The probability that Ei will be considered for task Tj is p (Pr{Ei is not considered for task
Tj} = 1− p). Also, it can be seen that, the consideration of Ei in any time slot is independent of
other time slots. So, the probability that Ei will not be considered at all for any of the ki tasks is
given as:
Pr[Xi < 1] = (1− p) · (1− p) . . . ki times
= (1− p)ki
Following the inequality 1 + x ≤ ex, we get
Pr[Xi < 1] ≤ e−p·ki = 1
ep·ki
Now, the probability that any Ei will be considered at least once is given as
Pr[Xi ≥ 1] ≥
(
1− 1
ep·ki
)
Hence, the claim survives. Also, for p = ln 2, we can see that
Pr[Xi ≥ 1] ≥
(
1− 1
eln 2·ki
)
=
(
1− 1
2ki
)
It can be concluded that, the term 12ki represents that any arbitrary Ei will not be considered
at all is very small, and can say that it is very unlikely to occur. So, the term (1 − 12ki ) will be
quite large and hence can say that any IoT device could be considered for at least once with larger
probability.
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6 Experimental Findings
In this section, we measure the efficacy of our proposed mechanism called TUBE-TAP via simu-
lation. It is to be noted that, the TUBE-TAP is compared with the carefully crafted benchmark
mechanism that is non-truthful in nature. The manipulative behaviour of the IoT devices in case
of benchmark mechanism can be seen evidently in the simulation results. It is to be noted that,
our benchmark mechanism differs in terms of allocation and payment policy from the TUBE-TAP.
In the benchmark mechanism, for each task, first the IoT devices are sorted in increasing order
of their bid value. Afterwards, the IoT devices are picked up sequentially one at a time from the
ordering and check is made that: whether the sum of the valuation of the IoT device next to it in
the ordering and some small constant value (say ) is less than or equal to the remaining budget
associated with the task or not. If the stopping condition is satisfied, then the IoT device will be
declared as winner, otherwise not. After the declaration of winner set, the payment of any IoT
device in the winning set is the sum of the bid value of the IoT device following it in the sorted
ordering and the  value. More formally, the payment of any ith IoT device for the task Tj is given
as P ji = b
j
i+1 + ; where b
j
i+1 is the bid value of the IoT device following i in the sorted ordering.
It is to be noted that the  value is same throughout the system, it is taken as  = 10 in our case.
The unit of bid value and the budget is taken as $. The experiments are carried out using Python.
6.1 Simulation Set-up
For our simulation purpose, we have varied the number of task requesters and the number of IoT
devices so as to analyse the results in a more better sense. Table 1 shows the configuration of
different values of number of task requesters and number of IoT devices that has been utilized
for the simulation purpose. For each configuration, the experiment runs for 50 rounds ad the
required values are plotted by taking average over these 50 rounds. Other than this, in order to
strengthen our claim, we have simulated the mechanisms for two different probability distributions
independently; namely, uniform distribution (UD) and normal distribution (ND). Throughout the
experiment, the bid value range (in case of UD) for IoT devices and the budget range for the tasks
are kept fixed. It is to be noted that, budget is uniformly distributed within the given range for
both ND and UD. Considering the case of ND, for generating the bid values of the IoT devices the
mean is taken as 110 and standard deviation is taken as 15.
Table 1: Data set utilized for simulation purpose
Task requesters 50 100 150 200 250 300
Task executers 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
Bid value range (for UD) [80, 150] [80, 150] [80, 150] [80, 150] [80, 150] [80, 150]
Budget distribution [400, 600] [400, 600] [400, 600] [400, 600] [400, 600] [400, 600]
In order to measure the efficacy of TUBE-TAP, we have taken two performance metrics: 1) Budget
utilization, and 2) Utility of the IoT devices.
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6.2 Result Analysis
In this section, we are simulating TUBE-TAP which we are claiming is budget feasible and truthful
in our setting against the benchmark mechanism (which will be referred as BM in the figures of
simulation results).
Considering the first parameter i.e. Budget utilization, we can see in Figure 6a, and Figure 6b
that the budget utilization in case of TUBE-TAP is a bit more as compared to the budget utilization
in case of BM for both ND and UD case. This is due to the fact that, in case of TUBE-TAP each
winner is paid a value between the bid value of last winner and the bid value of the first loser
present in the sorted ordering.
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
50 100 150 200 250 300
Bu
dg
et
 U
tili
za
tio
n
No. of Tasks
Available-Budgets
TUBE-TAP
BM
(a) Budget utilization (ND)
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Figure 6: Comparison of Budget utilization in ND and UD cases
However, in case of BM each winner is paid a bit more than the bid value of preceding IoT
device in the ordering. As the bid values of the IoT devices are sorted in increasing order, so the
payment made to each winning IoT device in case of TUBE-TAP is more as compared to BM. Due
to this reason, we can see that the budget utilization is higher in case of TUBE-TAP as compared
to BM shown in Figure 6a and Figure 6b. Another important observation one can make from
Figure 6a, and Figure 6b is that, both the mechanisms i.e. TUBE-TAP and BM are budget feasible
that supports the claim made for TUBE-TAP in Lemma 5.3.
Next comes the discussion on the behaviour of the mechanisms based on our second parameter.
The sole purpose of considering this parameter is to judge the two mechanisms on the ground of
truthfulness. It is already pointed out that BM is vulnerable to manipulation i.e. the IoT devices
can gain by misreporting their privately held bid values in case of BM. During the simulation, in
order to show the so called manipulative behaviour of BM we have varied the bid values of the
subset of the IoT devices. More formally, we have considered that 15% of the available IoT devices
(in our case this is referred as small variation) are increasing their bid value by 35% of their true
valuation. Similar is the case with medium variation (30%) and the large variation (40%). In the
figures of simulation results, BM with small variation, BM with medium variation, and BM with
large variation is shown as BM-S-var, BM-M-var, and BM-L-var respectively.
In Figure 7a and Figure 7b the comparison between the two mechanisms i.e. TUBE-TAP and
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BM is done based on the utility of the IoT devices parameter for ND and UD cases respectively.
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(a) Utility of IoT devices (ND)
 0
 2000
 4000
 6000
 8000
 10000
 12000
 14000
 16000
50 100 150 200 250 300
Ut
ilit
y 
of
 Io
T 
de
vic
es
No. of tasks
TUBE-TAP
BM
BM-S-var
BM-M-var
BM-L-var
(b) Utility of IoT devices (UD)
Figure 7: Comparison of Utility of IoT devices in ND and UD cases
It can be seen that, most of the time the utility of IoT devices for TUBE-TAP is more as
compared to the utility of IoT devices for BM in both ND and UD case. This very nature of TUBE-
TAP is due to the reason that IoT devices are paid higher in case of TUBE-TAP as compared to
BM that can be concluded from the results shown Figure 6a, and Figure 6b. Also, talking about the
manipulative nature of the BM, it can be easily seen in Figure 7a, and Figure 7b that overall utility
of the IoT devices gets increased by misreporting the bid values. The utility of IoT devices is higher
in case of large variation than in case of medium variation than in case of small variation. Also, in
some manipulative cases (mostly in large variation) it could be seen that the utility achieved by the
IoT devices in case of BM bypass even the utility gained by the IoT devices in case of TUBE-TAP.
So, one can conclude that larger the number of IoT devices increasing their bid value by some
amount (say 35%) higher will be the utility for the IoT devices. As the IoT devices are gaining by
misreporting, so BM is non-truthful.
7 Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we have investigated a heterogeneous task assignment problem in IoT based crowd-
sourcing through the lens of mechanism design. We have designed a truthful mechanism for the
problem such that for each task the total payment made to the subset of IoT devices are within
budget while achieving a threshold quality. In our future works, we can investigate the more re-
alistic version of the problem by injecting the constraint that the tasks endowed with the task
requesters are divisible in nature along with the several other additional constraints. We can think
of designing a truthful budget feasible mechanism for the more realistic version of the problem.
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